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Introduction 
The judicial career of United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer is marked by 
a philosophy of judicial pragmatism, as well as a desire for the Court to extend more deference to 
the legislative branch. Justice Breyer consistently examines the real-life consequences of any 
decision offered by the Court, and he places those consequences at the forefront of his thought 
process toward arriving at an opinion in any given case. His majority opinions, concurrences, 
and dissents appear to consistently display a concern not only for the litigants involved in the 
case before the Court, but for similarly situated citizens whose lives will be directly impacted by 
the decisions of the Court. The roles that justice Breyer has played before joining the Supreme 
Court are somewhat informative of his judicial philosophy, particularly in the area of deference 
to Congress and his desire not to interfere with a strong administrative branch without a clear 
constitutional violation. Perhaps his experience in all three branches of government has given 
Justice Breyer a unique perspective on the relationship among the branches, a relationship he 
discusses in his books. Perhaps a desire to get things done without unnecessary interference from 
the other branches may be partly driving his more pragmatic approach to judging any case. 
Justice Breyer was born in San Francisco in 1938. 1 He attended Stanford University and 
Oxford University, prior to law school, graduating from both institutions with honors and 
distinction. 2 He attended Harvard Law School, and went on to serve as a law clerk to Justice 
1Legallnformation Institute [L/1}: U.S. Supreme Court: Justice Breyer, Law.Corneii.Edu, 
http://www .law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/breyer.bio.html (last visited November 30, 2013 ). 
2 /d. 
1 
Arthur Goldberg of the United States Supreme Court.3 Justice Breyer is married to Joanna Hare, 
and they have three children, Chloe, Nell, and Michael. 4 
Justice Breyer's career prior to sitting on the bench may have played a role, I believe, on 
his judicial philosophy. He served as a Special Assistant to the Assistant U.S. Attorney General 
for Antitrust from 1965-1967.5 He was also an Assistant Special Prosecutor for the Watergate 
Special Prosecution Force in 1973, Special Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee from 
1974-1975, and Chief Counsel to the Judiciary committee from 1979-1980.6 These positions in 
both the legislative and executive branches provided Breyer with a unique experience across all 
branches of government that many other Justices do not possess. 
Throughout his career, until joining the bench, Justice Breyer served as a law professor at 
Harvard Law School, most notably teaching courses in Administrative Law, as well as teaching 
at Harvard' s undergraduate school and universities overseas.7 President Carter nominated Breyer 
to the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals in 1980, where he served as Chief Judge from 1990-1994, and 
President Clinton nominated him to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1994.8 
Justice Breyer describes his own judicial philosophy, derived from the judges and 
scholars that he most admires, as focused on judicial restraint and an awareness of the 
consequences of any particular decision. In quoting political philosopher Benjamin Constant's 
argument for "judicial modesty," Breyer states "The judge, compared to the legislator, lacks 
relevant expertise. The 'people' must develop the ' political experience' and they must obtain 'the 
3Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SupremeCourt.gov, 
http:/ /www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited November 30, 2013). 
4/d. 
5 /d . 
6 /d. 
7 Legal Information Institute [L/1]: U.S. Supreme Court: Justice Breyer, Law.Corneii.Edu, 
http:/ /www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/breyer.bio.html (last visited November 30, 2013). 
8 /d. 
2 
moral education and stimulus that come from ... correcting their own errors."9 In citing to Justice 
Brandeis, " ... ajudge's 'agreement or disagreement' about the wisdom of a law 'has nothing to 
do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. "'10 He is clearly more 
comfortable with the view of the judiciary as embodying a limited role compared to that of the 
legislature, as the legislature is more capable of developing that "political experience" based on 
the will of the people. 
Breyer also cites, through his own writings, the importance of consequences in any 
judicial decision. Quoting Judge Learned Hand, Breyer writes, "[ s ]ince law in connected to life, 
judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including 
'contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.' And 
since 'the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically 
relevant should be excluded.'" 11 Above all, Breyer believes the Court must serve a "pragmatic 
approach to interpreting the law." 12 The Court must examine real-world consequences, respect 
the other branches of government, and build a better relationship with the other branches of 
government. 13 
The following cases embody, in my view, Justice Breyer's judicial philosophy in one 
way or another. We see the Justice striving to convince the Court, and the public, that judges 
have a limited role to play with respect to the actions of Congress, i.e. the people. We also see 
Breyer pushing us to refrain from examining a case as a hypothetical story that only needs an 
9 Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 5 (2005) 
10 ld at 17 
11 Active Liberty at 18 
12 Stephen Breyer, Making our Democracy Work xiii, (2010) 
13 /d. 
3 
application of rigid rules, but to recognize that each case has real people in the background, 
whether litigants or not, with real impact on their day-to-day lives. 
I U.S. Airways Inc., v. Barnett 
Justice Breyer calls for a pragmatic approach for implementing certain aspects of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 14 in his majority opinion for US. Airways Inc., v. Barnett. 15 
Barnett, the Plaintiff, injured his back as an employee at the airline unloading cargo. 16 He 
requested a transfer to the mailroom as a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA statute. 17 
But there was also a seniority system in place at the airline that would allow two other 
employees to secure the mailroom position before Barnett. 18 The airline did not give Barnett an 
exception to the seniority system, and he ultimately lost his job. 19 Barnett claimed, under the 
ADA, that the airline discriminated against him by failing to provide the reasonable 
accommodation of granting him the mailroom position.20 The District Court granted summary 
judgment to the airline because the ADA does not require the employer to submit to an 
accommodation if it will impose "undue hardship on the operations of the employer's 
business."21 However, the 9th circuit reversed, and held that merely having a long established 
seniority system in place does not automatically establish that the airline would suffer undue 
hardship, with permission to prevent the accommodation.22 Rather, the 9th circuit called for a 
more case-by-case analysis.23 Here, Justice Breyer and the Court are deciding whether the ADA 
14 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. 
15 535 u.s. 391 (2002). 









requires to airline to ignore its seniority system in favor of an accommodation for a disabled 
employee. 24 
By first highlighting the extreme positions of both parties, Justice Breyer signals his 
desire for a middle-ground approach. Barnett claims that the presence of a seniority system is 
never good enough to establish undue hardship to the employer,25 while the airline argues that 
the mere existence of a seniority system that might be disrupted is all that an employer needs to 
show the requisite hardship and avoid the accommodation?6 The airline says the ADA was never 
meant to provide "preferences", only "equality."27 But Justice Breyer says the statute naturally 
will involve some preferences in order to create equality. 28 Any reasonable accommodation will 
be preferential treatment to a degree, otherwise "the reasonable accommodation could not 
accomplish its intended objective." 29 
Justice Breyer makes it a point not to dismiss or minimize the right of every employer to 
impose "neutral rules," such as seniority systems, and have those rules respected. 30 He does not 
feel that Congress intended seniority systems to be undermined by "complex case-specific 
accommodations", and perhaps a violation of a seniority system is sufficient to defeat the 
accommodation. 31 After all, there is an expectation on the part of other employees to be able to 
take advantage of the seniority system. 32 With that argument, we see Justice Breyer concerned 
with how a broad ruling in favor of accommodations at the expense of seniority systems will 
24 /d. at 396. 
25 /d. at 400. 
26 /d. at 397. 
27 /d. at 397. 
28 /d. at 397. 
29 ld. at 397. 
30 /d. at 404. 
31 /d . at 404-405. 
32 /d. 
5 
impact a great number of employees across the country, who are not involved in this case. At the 
same time, he allows an opening for Barnett to prove that "special circumstances" exist which 
show that this particular employer, U.S. Airways, had taken steps in the past to alter its seniority 
system, thereby lessening the overall employee expectation of strict adherence to the seniority 
system.33 Justice Breyer demonstrates his philosophy that the realties which exist at a particular 
place of employment should not be ignored in favor of black -letter rules for every place of 
employment. 
II Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt 
Justice Breyer refuses to adjust the basic expectations of contracting parties, even if one 
of those parties is the United States Government, when he writes the opinion for a unanimous 
Court in Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt.34 Under the Indian Self Determination and Education 
Assistance Act/5 Indian Tribes and the U.S. Government may enter into contracts where the 
tribe will provide services that the government would otherwise provide. 36 In this case, a Tribe 
agreed to provide health services to its people that a government agency would ordinarily 
provide, and the government agreed to pay administrative expenses and "contract support 
costs. "37 The Government then refused to pay the contract support costs because it said Congress 
did not appropriate sufficient funds. 38 
While Justice Breyer's pre-judicial background, such as working in both the executive 
and legislative branches, has often provided him with a strong desire to defer to Congress and 
administrative agencies, the fundamental principles of contract performance prevail in this 
33 !d. at 405-406. 
34 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
35 25 U.S.C. §450 et seq. 
36 543 U.S. at 634. 
37 !d. at 635. 
38 /d. 
6 
decision. He does not allow the Government to establish "special circumstances" that would 
enable its legal departure from the terms of its contracts. 
The Government argues that a Tribe "steps into the shoes" of government agency during 
the contractual process under this statute, and as such, government agencies know that funding 
for such contracts is always subject to congressional appropriations. 39 There is some statutory 
language that lends some support to the Government's argument, in that such contracts between 
government agencies are not considered "procurement contracts."40 But Justice Breyer does not 
buy into the Government's argument. He points out that the Act uses the word "contract" 426 
times to define the relationship between the Government and Indian Tribes in these situations, 
and "contracts" generally mean "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." 41 
Justice Breyer then proceeds to dismiss a number of the Government's arguments one by 
one. The Government argues the Act does not require Health and Human Services (HHS) to 
reduce funding for one program to provide funding to another tribe. But an alternative need for 
funds, as Breyer points out, cannot rescue the government from its promises in a procurement 
contract, and the Court doesn't find anything special about the promises here.42 The statutory 
language that funds are "subject to availability" doesn't help the government either.43 Such 
language is often used in government contracts to indicate to a contracting party that Congress 
has not yet fully appropriated the necessary funds. 44 But here, Congress already appropriated 
39 /d. at 638. 
40 /d. 
41 /d. at 639; citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §1 (1979). 
42 /d. at 642. 
43 /d. at 643. 
44 /d. 
7 
adequate unrestricted funds to HHS, and therefore availability is not a problem. 45 The 
Government further claims that Congress appropriated a total amount to be spent on Indian 
Health Services "contract support costs" from 1994 through 1998, but those funds were spent 
long before 1998. Breyer responds that a statute cannot "retroactively repudiate the 
Government's contractual obligations" without violating the constitution. 46 
In each instance of Breyer's rejection of the Government's "special circumstances" for 
failing to uphold their responsibilities under the contracts, he points both to the reality that the 
necessary funds do exist under the control of HHS, and, more importantly, that a contracting 
party, in this case an Indian Tribe, should not be retroactively penalized just because the other 
contracting party (the Government) feels that it no longer has the money for that contract. This 
case involves some complicated analysis of the relevant statute, but I feel that at the heart of 
Justice Breyer's decision is a more basic policy in favor of upholding the performance of 
contracts, and a concern about the consequences of failing to do so. 
Ill Gray v. Maryland 
In Gray v. Maryland,47 Justice Breyer writes a majority opinion that applies a sense of 
reality and practical consequences which accompany a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights. Bruton v. United States48 established that, where two co-defendants are tried 
jointly, a confession made by one of those defendants cannot be used as admissible evidence 
against the non-confessing co-defendant. Justice Breyer and the majority extend this rule in Gray 
45 /d . 
46 /d. at 645-646. 
47 523 u.s. 185 (1998) 
48 391 U.S. 123 (1968) 
8 
to account for the practical difficulty in sometimes eliminating one co-defendant from the 
reading of a confession during trial. 
Defendants Bell and Gray were tried jointly for a murder where Bell had confessed.49 
The police officer who read the confession into evidence used the word "deletion" whenever 
Gray's name was mentioned. 5° The judge instructed the jury that the confession was to be used 
only against Bell, but Gray was ultimately convicted also. 51 
Justice Breyer aims to be mindful of precedent. There was a case since Bruton, 
Richardson v. Marsh, 52 where portions of a co-defendant's confession were redacted to eliminate 
any mention of the other co-defendant's involvement in the crime. 53 The Court in Marsh 
narrowed Bruton to allow admission of the evidence, because in Marsh the jury needed to link 
several pieces of evidence for the confession to incriminate the defendant, and the redaction 
eliminated ANY reference. 54 But the court in Marsh expressly said they had no opinion about 
what to do if a word or symbol was placed to redact the codefendant's name. 55 
Justice Breyer maintains respect for the precedent in Marsh, but distinguishes that the 
confession in Gray still refers the jury to the existence of another person in Bell's confession. 56 
Breyer takes a very common sense approach, with the anticipated thoughts of the jury in mind, 
and says that to replace Gray's name with an obvious blank, or symbol, or other word will not 
fool anyone on the jury.57 In Marsh, any reference in the confession to another person was 
49 523 U.S. at 188 
50 /d. 
51 /d. at 189 
52 481 u.s. 200 (1987) 
53 523 U.S. at 190-191 
54 ld. at 191 
55 /d. 
56 /d. at 192. 
57 ld. at 193. 
9 
completely redacted, and the jury needed to link the confession to other evidence to realize that 
the codefendant might have been named in the confession. 58 Here, Breyer holds, the replacement 
of Gray's name in the confession is facially incriminating. 59 
Justice Breyer tries to reconcile the constitutional principle embodied in Bruton with the 
narrowing effect of Marsh. In doing so, he establishes that the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation is clearly paramount here, and in order to truly protect the defendant in that regard, 
we have to consider the real world consequence of having a jury listen to a police officer read the 
confession of one of the defendants, who clearly identifies a fellow perpetrator (even if the 
officer replaces that person's name with "deletion"), at which point the jury will look to the 
counsel table and see two defendants. Again, Justice Breyer is looking to uphold Bruton in a 
practical way that makes sense when applying the Bruton doctrine to an actual jury deliberation. 
Breyer also, consistent with his pragmatic approach, appears to provide prosecutors with 
reasons that this broadening of Bruton will not negatively impact their cases. He points out that it 
is not difficult for a prosecutor to redact without the use of symbols or replacement words. 60 
There is no risk of mistrials, or abandoning confessions, if these redactions are conducted 
properly, and many circuits have been acting in this manner under Bruton for years. 61 
IV Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez 
Justice Breyer authors the majority opinion in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez.62 I feel that 
his pragmatism again shines through in this case in his efforts to prevent aiders and abetters of 
criminal activity from arguing that they possess a lesser liability. While this case deals directly 
58 /d. at 195-196. 
59 /d. at 196. 
60 /d. at 197. 
61 /d. 
62 549 U.S. 183 (2007) 
10 
with the interaction between a state theft statute and a federal immigration statute, it also appears 
that Justice Breyer is thinking more broadly to prevent Supreme Court precedent from providing 
any erosion in accomplice liability. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act63 lists several offenses, including "theft offenses," 
which subjects certain aliens to removal from the United States.64 The Defendant in this case, a 
permanent resident alien, was convicted in California of a vehicle theft, under a California statute 
that holds accomplices guilty in the same manner as the person actually responsible for the 
theft.65 The federal government viewed this crime and conviction as a "generic theft offense," 
and moved for removal proceedings consistent with the Immigration Act.66 A federal 
immigration judge agreed that this crime was a "generic theft offense" contemplated by the 
statute, and began removal proceedings. 67 The Court is asked to decide "whether one who aids or 
abets a theft falls, like a principal, within the scope of this generic definition. "68 Breyer and the 
majority conclude that aiders and abetters do fall within the definition of generic theft. 69 
Justice Breyer looks at the treatment of accomplice liability across jurisdictions, likely to 
highlight the universally accepted principle that an accomplice is also liable for a theft. 70 This is 
so because of the "natural and probable consequences doctrine," that exists in most jurisdictions, 
which holds an accomplice liable not only for the crimes that he and his cohorts intended, but 
also for the crimes that "naturally and probably result from his intended crime."71 Breyer places 
63 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. 
64 549 U.S. at 185-186. 
65 /d. at 187. 




70 /d. at 189-190. 
71 /d. at 190-191. 
11 
the onus on the Defendant to show that California's treatment of aiders and abetters criminalizes 
conduct that most other states would not consider theft. 72 The Defendant here argues that 
California's version of the natural and probable consequences doctrine makes him "criminally 
liable for conduct he did not intend, not even as a known or almost certain by product of the 
Defendant's intentional acts."73 But Breyer makes the point that California law is not as strict as 
Defendant sees it, and it only convicts people of aiding and abetting who share the purpose/intent 
of the perpetrator. 74 Breyer cites other California decisions where the aider has at least 
foreseeable knowledge that the crime could be committed when he helped in some way. 75 The 
Defendant needs to point to specific cases where the State of California convicted people of 
aiding and abetting in a way that falls outside the generic way in which that is normally done, 
and the Defendant had not accomplished that goal here. 76 
Justice Breyer would have been willing to accept Defendant's argument upon a showing 
that California had been convicting accomplices in a radical way. He specifically asks the 
Defendant to show California's departure from typical accomplice liability, and then rejects the 
Defendant's attempt to pose hypothetical scenarios to the Court to show that California would 
convict accomplices no matter their intent. I think Breyer's approach here indicates not only his 
respect for precedent across jurisdictions, unless some special circumstance applies, but also a 
preservation of an important staple of substantive criminal law, that accomplices should be 
subject to the same liability as the principal actor. A contradictory opinion in this case, even 
72 Jd. at 191. 
73 /d. 




though dealing with a more narrow issue of immigration removal, could have had an eroding 
effect on accomplice liability, and I think Justice Breyer is aware and mindful of that concern. 
V US. v. Lopez 
There is perhaps no clearer example of Justice Breyer's pragmatic focus on the realties of 
the world, in his view, and the consequences of the Court's decision, than his Dissenting opinion 
in United States v. Lopez.77 Breyer thoroughly displays his concern that the majority is not 
looking down the road at what a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Gun Free School Zone 
Act will have on children and the economy. In this case, more aggressively than any other Breyer 
decision I have read, we see the Justice passionately focusing our attention on the realities of life 
outside of the Court, the statute, and precedent, and driving home a basic idea that a gun in a 
school building has ripple effects on the lived of children that Congress had every right to 
consider and take action upon. Whether Breyer's view is rightly or wrongly contemplated is not 
the issue for the purpose of this discussion. What is important in Lopez is the myriad of methods 
he uses to make his point, which all ultimately boil down to the application of practicality. 
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun Free School Zone Act, establishing a federal offense 
·for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has 
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."78 A Ith grader was arrested in Texas for carrying 
a loaded handgun to schoo1.79 Federal agents charged the young man with a violation of the Gun 
Free School Zone Act. 80 The Defendant argued that the Act itself was unconstitutional, and the 
77 514 u.s. 549 (1995) . 
78 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(1)(A). 
79 514 U.S. at 551. 
80 /d. 
13 
majority agreed, holding that Congress had overstepped its bounds when trying to regulate 
interstate commerce in this way. 81 Justice Breyer dissents. 
Breyer feels this regulation is well within the power of Congress, as Congress can 
regulate local activities IF they affect interstate commerce.82 To figure out if a local activity 
affects interstate commerce, Breyer argues, we can't just look at this one instance of someone 
carrying a gun on school property, we have to look at what would happen if occurrences like this 
happened in greater numbers. 83 The Justice is initially establishing his argument that we have to 
look at future consequences in order to determine constitutionality. Additionally, in judging the 
connection between regulation and interstate commerce, we're supposed to give more deference 
to Congress to make that connection, as Congress is better suited to accurately investigate such 
things than the courts. 84 The main question that Breyer wants to ask is: Could CONGRESS, not 
the Court, have rationally found a connection between violent schools, quality of education, and 
impact on interstate commerce ?85 
Justice Breyer sets out a framework in this dissent that gets to the heart of his judicial 
philosophy of pragmatism and consequential thinking. He refers to the commerce connection as 
not a "technical legal connection" but a "practical connection."86 He cites a long series of 
governmental reports showing gun violence at schools leads to drop outs and decreased 
academic achievement87, and he goes through a lengthy discussion about global competition and 
81 /d. 
82 /d. at 615. 
83 ld. at 616. 
84 /d. at 616-617 . 
85 /d. at 618. 
86 /d. 
87 /d. at 619-620 
14 
the connection to quality primary and secondary education. 88 This is the backdrop for Breyer's 
conclusion that Congress could have found that since education is so intertwined with the 
economy, guns in schools become a "commercial problem" as well as a "human problem."89 
In looking carefully at Breyer's word choice throughout his dissent, I can't help but 
notice how he subtly reminds us of the social consequences of this decision. There is no doubt 
that he stays on task of arguing the commercial reasons for upholding the Act, because it is those 
commercial reasons which enforce the commerce clause argument. However, I think Breyer also 
signals through his dissent, that there are practical real-life reasons to uphold this statute which 
are non-economic, namely that gun violence is a threat and a danger to children. As cited above, 
he subtly reminds us that this is a "human problem" not just a "commercial problem. "90 When 
distinguishing gun violence from the other areas of local activity which the majority fears 
Congress could take over as a result of Breyer's view, he reminds us that gun violence is "life-
threatening" to children, and is therefore special as compared to divorce, child custody or other 
areas. 91 These and other references may have been a reminder from Breyer that this issue is not 
just an exercise in mechanically calculating whether or not the commerce clause has been 
violated. 
In wrapping up his commerce clause argument, Justice Breyer provides an additional 
slice of common sense. He makes the point that it is perfectly rational for Congress to decide that 
education falls on the "commercial side of the line." After all, in 1990, the year the Gun Free 
School Zone Act was passed, education cost this country $230 billion, and we didn't pay that 
88 /d. at 621. 
89 ld. at 620. 
90 /d. 
91 /d. at 624 
15 
only for social reasons, we paid that to provide skills to future workers to contribute to our 
economy. 92 
VI Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 
The practical expectation of how families expect their property to be distributed upon 
death governs Justice Breyer's dissent in Egelhoffv. Egelhoff.93 Mr. Egelhoff had in place a life 
insurance policy and pension plan through ERISA94, both naming Mrs. Egelhoff as beneficiary. 95 
After the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died shortly thereafter without changing the 
designation of his wife as beneficiary under the ERISA plan.96 A Washington State statute 
automatically revokes an ex-spouse from taking non-probate assets, including life insurance 
policies and employee benefit plans. 97 But ERISA, a federal statute, does not have such a 
provision.98 Justice Thomas and the majority hold that the state statute is preempted by ERISA, 
because it "relates to" a benefit plan covered by ERISA, and the court does not want to require 
the federal government to master the beneficiary laws of 50 individual states. 99 
Justice Breyer begins his analysis in dissent by concluding that there is no direct conflict 
between ERISA and the state statute. 100 But the more interesting analysis that he develops is that 
the majority too quickly concluded a direct conflict. Rather, it is a legitimate open question to 
Justice Breyer whether ERISA forces a decedent to pay a former spouse as beneficiary after 
divorce. 101 Justice Breyer focuses on the expectations that a person likely has in these situations. 
92 /d. at 629-630. 
93 532 U.S. 141 (2001) 
94 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. 




99 /d. at 146-152. 
100 ld. at 154. 
101 /d. at 156. 
16 
He claims that the state statute at issue here does not obstruct ERISA' s purpose, but rather the 
statute assists with carrying out ERISA's objective of protecting employee benefits. 102 Breyer 
looks at the reality that divorced workers likely prefer their children, not their ex-spouses, to 
receive their assets. 103 Breyer further points out, that not everyone is going to have the 
sophistication to proactively change their beneficiary upon divorce, and we should have some 
respect for their expectations even if they failed to follow through with the correct procedure. 104 
He refers to this as "consistent with human experience."105 
Finally, on the majority's point that federal officials should not have to master state 
statutes to administer ERISA, Breyer again proposes that the Court look at the reality of the 
situation before making such an assertion. Federal administrators must learn state laws to answer 
routine questions for citizens across the country. 106 Respecting state statutes like these does not 
put administrators in a difficult position of deciding choice of law questions, they will simply 
look to state law to administer the plan. 107 And, if the federal government does not like that 
approach, Breyer continues, Congress can change the ERISA law to create uniformity in this 
area, and the ERISA documents can reflect that change to make it easier for everyone. 108 
Breyer's attempt to direct Congress and the federal administrators toward implementing policies 
to resolve this issue, instead of pre-empting state law through the Court, may reflect Breyer's 
background as a Senate lawyer and Justice Department lawyer. He clearly favors resolving 
conflicts such as this through the democratic-legislative process. 
102 /d. at 158. 
103 /d. at 158-159. 
104 /d. at 159. 
105 /d. 
106 Jd. at 157. 
107 /d. at 158. 
108 /d. at 158. 
17 
VII Bush v. Gore 
In Bush v. Gore 109, the majority halted the recount of Florida's presidential election 
ballots in 2000 because Equal Protection mandated, in the Court's view, that all ballots receive a 
recount, not just a selection of ballots, and that such a recount should be conducted with uniform 
standards across the state. 110 Justice Breyer agrees that uniform standards of conducting a 
recount would have been wise111 , but his disagreement with the remedy of halting the recount 
altogether, as he describes in part of his dissenting opinion112, is instructive as to Breyer's view 
of the Court's role in the context of the circumstances. 
Breyer would have preferred remanding the case back to the Florida Supreme Court, 
with instructions to recount ALL undercounted votes, even if they were already recounted, under 
one standard. 113 He takes issue with the majority's argument that there is insufficient time to 
conduct another recount. 114 Specifically, Breyer argues that the Court does not have enough 
evidence to know whether or not time permits an additional recount; such a decision should be 
made by the state of Florida, as state courts are better equipped to make such a determination. 115 
Again, we see Justice Breyer worried about consequences, and attempting to point out 
how un-pragmatic the majority remedy is. The Court is trying to protect fairness, and yet refuses, 
in Breyer's view, to implement the only fair remedy left, a statewide manual recount. 116 Breyer 
interestingly points out the already built in disparity between counties that have optical scan 
109 531 u.s. 98 (2000) 
110 /d. at 145. 
111 /d. at 146. 
112 Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion contains several areas of analysis. I have focused my attention on his 
dissenting argument regarding the majority's remedy to halt the recount altogether. 
113 /d. 
114 /d. 
115 /d. at 146-147. 
116 /d. 
18 
machines and counties that have punch card ballots. 117 It does not make sense to him that the 
majority adds a layer to that inequality by prohibiting the state from conducting another recount, 
particularly when the Florida Supreme Court has already drafted an order to address this 
. • 118 Inequity. 
VIII Bd. of Educ. v. Earls 
In Bd. of Educ. v. Earls 119, the Court took on the constitutional issue of required drug 
testing of high school students. Specifically the Court focused on whether such an intrusion 
would violate a student's right to privacy. 120 A school district in rural Oklahoma mandated that 
any high ~chool student involved in "competitive extra-curricular activities" would be subject to 
drug testing, even without suspicion of drug use. 121 Several parents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 122 The Court, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority, ultimately held that this 
policy was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because: (1) schools have a custodial responsibility to maintain "discipline, health, 
and safety" which required a limitation of a student's privacy rights, 123 (2) students who 
participate in athletic or non-athletic activities have a lesser expectation of privacy because of 
"off campus travel and communal undress, 124 (3) the nature of obtaining the urine sample was 
not overly intrusive in this case, 125 and ( 4) due to the epidemic nature of drug use the Court does 
117 Jd. 
118 /d. 
119 536 U.S. 822 (2002) 
120 /d. 
121 /d. at 826. 
122 !d. at 827. 
123 Jd. at 830-831. 
124 !d. at 832. 
125 ld. at 832-833. 
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not require a threshold need for the school district to prove a specific drug problem among these 
students in order to require drug testing without suspicion. 126 
Justice Breyer actually joins with the conservative majority of the Rehnquist Court in this 
case, and writes a concurring opinion. 127 He tries to further highlight why the majority opinion 
was decided correctly. He focuses first on the seriousness of drug use among children, 
highlighting several government reports showing sobering data regarding adolescent drug use. 128 
He also touches upon the reality that public schools are expected to do more than simply teach; 
school districts are expected to take on a greater role in everything from feeding students during 
the day to providing "medical and psychological services."129 Breyer feels that these factual 
realities regarding the supervisory (somewhat parental) role that school systems play has an 
impact on a child's expectation ofprivacy. 130 He even goes as far as to suggest that if school 
districts don't fulfill that role properly, parents will react by removing their kids from public 
schools, with assistance from the government, impacting the funding of public schools 
(essentially raising a school vouchers argument in this context). 131 
Breyer also makes a very practical argument, consistent with his jurisprudence, regarding 
the effect of this policy on peer pressure. 132 He argues that a school system which provides for 
this type of drug testing policy allows students an excuse to resist pressures of taking drugs from 
their friends. 133 Breyer explains that a student could use the existence of a drug testing policy to 
decline taking drugs because he wants to try out for a sports team or some non-athletic school 
126 /d. at 835-837. 
127 /d. at 838. 
128 /d. at 839. 
129 /d. at 840. 
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activity. 134 Whether Breyer is correct in his assumptions about teenage behavior is unclear. 
However, he once again displays his judicial philosophy of trying to examine the real life 
circumstances in which the Court's decision will exist. He is imagining what effect this drug 
testing policy will have in the hallways and locker rooms in this high school, or any high school, 
and focusing his opinion on such realities. 
Breyer also displays his desire, in this concurrence, residents of this Oklahoma 
community to engage in the democratic process around this issue of drug testing. Specifically, 
Justice Breyer recognizes the concern and embarrassment of many students with having to 
provide a urine sample while a teacher waits outside the restroom, listening to make sure the 
student provides the sample himself. 135 Breyer encourages the community to engage in public 
meetings, to allow the residents to "participate in developing the drug policy." 136 
IX Apprendi v. New Jersey 
Justice Breyer again calls for practicality in dealing with the constitutionality of a New 
Jersey hate crimes statute in his dissenting opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey. 137 The Defendant 
was arrested for firing a weapon "into the home of an African-American family." 138 He 
confessed, but then later retracted, that he did so because the family was African-American. 139 
The Defendant pled guilty. 140 Offenses such as this carry an enhanced sentence if they are found 
to have occurred with "biased purposes" under NJ.S.A. 2C:44-3(e).141 After entrance of the 
guilty plea, the judge concluded, by preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed 
134 /d. 
135 /d. at 841. 
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137 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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with biased purposes, and increased the sentence accordingly. 142 Defendant's appeal argues that 
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution was violated because the question of bias should 
have been presented to a jury, with the appropriate "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard! 43 
Justice Stevens writing for the majority, finds for the Defendant that the actions of the New 
Jersey courts in this case violated Due Process because a fact that increases a sentence above the 
statutory maximum must be presented to a jury for fact finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 144 
Justice Breyer's dissent describes the majority opinion as striving for an ideal that cannot 
be achieved in the modern criminal justice system. 145 He feels the idea of requiring a jury to 
examine sentencing in the way the majority suggests is so impractical that the Constitution 
cannot be read to envision such a process. 146 
Breyer highlights the merits of requiring judges instead of juries to impose sentencing, 
within the sentencing guidelines made available by legislatures. 147 He says "it is important to 
realize that the reason is not a theoretical one, but a practical one."148 He shows great respect for 
the U.S. Sentencing guidelines, pointing out that the guidelines make note that a sentencing 
system cannot be implemented to reflect every "conceivable wrinkle of each case," as such 
would be unworkable. 149 Equally unworkable, according to Breyer, would be to require a jury to 
go through that exercise. 150 
142 /d. at 471. 
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Justice Breyer argues that there was a time when there existed too much judicial 
discretion regarding sentencing, but the Legislature has already taken action to remedy that 
problem. 151 Specifically, legislatures have "directly limited the use (by judges or by a 
commission) of particular factors in sentencing, either by specifying statutorily how a particular 
factor will affect the sentence imposed or by specifying how a commission should use a 
particular factor when writing a guideline."152 He is unable to understand why the majority 
would find a violation of the constitution when the legislatures have provided the guidelines, but 
conversely the Court did not find a violation in the past when judges acted without limitations set 
by the legislatures. 153 Further, the Court has no problem with Congress enacting guidelines for 
judges in terms of sentencing, and Breyer is confused as to why the Court has a problem with a 
statute that imposes an increased sentence upon the finding of certain circumstances, such as 
bias. 154 While this case sets out, in the majority opinion, to deal with the theoritcal question 
about the role of a judge versus the role of a jury, I think Breyer's dissent focuses our attention 
on a more practical question regarding how far a legislature can go to guide and/or direct judges 
in terms of sentencing. Breyer's opinion, again, embodies his desires for practicality as well as a 
deference to the legislative branch. 
X Morse v. Frederick 
Justice Breyer weighs into the complex issue of a high school student's right to free 
speech, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Morse v. Frederick. 155 At a school 
sanctioned event, across the street from the local high school, a high school student displayed a 
151 /d. at 560. 
152 /d. 
153 ld. at 561. 
154 /d. 
155 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
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banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."156 The school principal confiscated the banner and 
suspended the student for 10 days. 157 The student filed an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming 
his First Amendment Rights had been violated. 158 The Court, with the majority opinion written 
by Chief Justice Roberts, finds that the banner advocated illegal drug use. 159 The Court cites 
earlier precedent that a student's First Amendment rights may be suppressed if there is a 
reasonable conclusion that his expression will "materially and substantially disrupt the work and 
discipline of the schoo1."160 The constitutional rights of public school children are not 
automatically an extension of the rights of adults in other settings. 161 The Court does not go so 
far as to restrict this student's speech because it is offensive. 162 But the Court is willing to restrict 
this student's speech because it advocates illegal drug use, and the school has a responsibility to 
prevent the dangers of illegal drug use. 163 
Justice Breyer interestingly urges the Court not to get involved in whether or not the First 
Amendment has been violated in this case, and instead would have reached the same ultimate 
result by concluding that "qualified immunity bars the student's claim for monetary damages" 
and leaving alone the precedent setting constitutional issue. 164 He is concerned that the Court 
may have now permitted school officials to restrict student expression in a way that goes too 
far. 165 Breyer worries that the reality of conversations or other forms of expressions among high 
school students might, at times, revolve around illegal substances, and perhaps the Court has 
156 /d. at 397. 
157 ld. at 398. 
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now granted schools the ability to suppress any kind of speech of that nature, even if innocently 
made without the intent of encouraging drug use. 166 Again we see Justice Breyer envisioning the 
real life impact on every day high school students. 
Breyer also makes a kind of "slippery slope" argument in terms of the school's 
permission, through the Court's opinion, to regulate speech regarding drugs in particular. Breyer 
practically points out that drugs are not the only harm which students face, and from which 
schools are charged with protecting students. 167 I think Breyer is concerned about the possibility 
that this opinion will open the door for speech about other dangers to be suppressed by school 
officials. He reminds us that the Court, during World War II, refused to regulate students' free 
speech around the subject of war, and he wishes the Court would follow that advice in this 
opinion. 168 
"Qualified Immunity" here provides the school principal, in Breyer's view, with the 
protection against monetary damages because she did not intentionally violate someone's 
constitutional rights; she merely reacted to a misbehaving teenager.169 To hold otherwise, in 
Breyer's view, only invites more litigation from around the country on these issues. 170 Breyer's 
common sense of reality is to find a non-constitutional avenue for avoiding such complications. 
Conclusion 
An additional reference to the Bush v. Gore dissent seems fitting to conclude on Justice 
Breyer's philosophy. 
166 /d. 
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However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral 
disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the people's will far more accurately 
than does an unelected Court. And the people's will is what elections are about. ... 
[Public confidence] is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect 
basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself. ... [W]e do risk a self-inflicted wound-a 
wound that may harm not just the Court, but the Nation." 171 
While Bush v. Gore, as discussed earlier, was specifically focused on the resolution of a 
contested presidential election, I think Breyer's words here cut across his more general concern 
about the immense power with which the Court possesses, and the manner in which the Court 
yields that power. He talks about the expression of the "people's will," the idea that it may not be 
the role of the Court to hold things in place as it sees fit, but rather to allow the people to decide, 
through the Congress granted to them, which direction they wish to go. Scholars have written 
about the divergent viewpoints of Scalia and Breyer, a strict construction of the Constitution 
versus a view of the Constitution as a living document. 172 And throughout these cases, I think we 
can see what Breyer means by a "living document." The Constitution is a framework, meant to 
apply to situations that the founding fathers could never have imagined. 173 Breyer consistently 
urges the Court to respect the idea that Congressional action, which may not be directly 
envisioned by the Constitution, is still valid as long as it stays within the constitutional 
framework, because it is the result of the will of the people in a democracy. "In the framer's 
eyes ... the Court would help to maintain the workable democracy that the Constitution sought to 
create ... the Court should interpret written words ... using traditional legal tools ... and, 
particularly, purposes and related consequences, to help the law effective. In this way, the Court 
can help maintain the public's confidence in the legitimacy of its interpretive role." 174 
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